Vendor import of OpenSSH 8.1p1

.skipped-commit-ids

@@ -6,6 +6,11 @@ fa728823ba21c4b45212750e1d3a4b2086fd1a62	more Makefile refactoring
 814b2f670df75759e1581ecef530980b2b3d7e0f	remove redundant make defs
 04431e8e7872f49a2129bf080a6b73c19d576d40	moduli update
 c07772f58028fda683ee6abd41c73da3ff70d403	moduli update
+db6375fc302e3bdf07d96430c63c991b2c2bd3ff	moduli update
+5ea3d63ab972691f43e9087ab5fd8376d48e898f	uuencode.c Makefile accident
+99dd10e72c04e93849981d43d64c946619efa474	include sshbuf-misc.c
+9e1c23476bb845f3cf3d15d9032da3ed0cb2fcf5	sshbuf-misc.c in regress
+569f08445c27124ec7c7f6c0268d844ec56ac061	Makefile tweaks for !openssl
 
 Old upstream tree:
 

CREDITS

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ David Agraz <dagraz@jahoopa.com> - Build fixes
 David Del Piero <David.DelPiero@qed.qld.gov.au> - bug fixes
 David Hesprich <darkgrue@gue-tech.org> - Configure fixes
 David Rankin <drankin@bohemians.lexington.ky.us> - libwrap, AIX, NetBSD fixes
-Dag-Erling Smrgrav <des at freebsd.org> - Challenge-Response PAM code.
+Dag-Erling Smørgrav <des at freebsd.org> - Challenge-Response PAM code.
 Dhiraj Gulati <dgulati@sco.com> - UnixWare long passwords
 Ed Eden <ede370@stl.rural.usda.gov> - configure fixes
 Garrick James <garrick@james.net> - configure fixes

INSTALL

@@ -14,8 +14,9 @@ Zlib 1.1.4 or 1.2.1.2 or greater (earlier 1.2.x versions have problems):
 http://www.gzip.org/zlib/
 
 libcrypto from either of:
- - LibreSSL (http://www.libressl.org/)
- - OpenSSL 1.0.x >= 1.0.1 or 1.1.0 >= 1.1.0g (http://www.openssl.org/)
+ - LibreSSL (https://www.libressl.org/)
+ - OpenSSL (https://www.openssl.org) with any of the following versions:
+   - 1.0.x >= 1.0.1 or 1.1.0 >= 1.1.0g or any 1.1.1
 
 LibreSSL/OpenSSL should be compiled as a position-independent library
 (i.e. with -fPIC) otherwise OpenSSH will not be able to link with it.
@@ -23,23 +24,28 @@ If you must use a non-position-independent libcrypto, then you may need
 to configure OpenSSH --without-pie.  Note that due to a bug in EVP_CipherInit
 OpenSSL 1.1 versions prior to 1.1.0g can't be used.
 
+To support Privilege Separation (which is now required) you will need
+to create the user, group and directory used by sshd for privilege
+separation.  See README.privsep for details.
+
 The remaining items are optional.
 
 NB. If you operating system supports /dev/random, you should configure
 libcrypto (LibreSSL/OpenSSL) to use it. OpenSSH relies on libcrypto's
-direct support of /dev/random, or failing that, either prngd or egd
+direct support of /dev/random, or failing that, either prngd or egd.
 
 PRNGD:
 
 If your system lacks kernel-based random collection, the use of Lutz
-Jaenicke's PRNGd is recommended.
+Jaenicke's PRNGd is recommended. It requires that libcrypto be configured
+to support it.
 
 http://prngd.sourceforge.net/
 
 EGD:
 
-If the kernel lacks /dev/random the Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) is
-supported only if libcrypto supports it.
+The Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) suppports the same interface as prngd.
+It also supported only if libcrypto is configured to support it.
 
 http://egd.sourceforge.net/
 
@@ -131,10 +137,6 @@ make install
 This will install the binaries in /opt/{bin,lib,sbin}, but will place the
 configuration files in /etc/ssh.
 
-If you are using Privilege Separation (which is enabled by default)
-then you will also need to create the user, group and directory used by
-sshd for privilege separation.  See README.privsep for details.
-
 If you are using PAM, you may need to manually install a PAM control
 file as "/etc/pam.d/sshd" (or wherever your system prefers to keep
 them).  Note that the service name used to start PAM is __progname,

LICENCE

@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ OpenSSH contains no GPL code.
 	Gert Doering
 	Jakob Schlyter
 	Jason Downs
-	Juha Yrjölä
+	Juha Yrjölä
 	Michael Stone
 	Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
 	Solar Designer

Makefile.in

@@ -87,10 +87,10 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
 	authfd.o authfile.o \
 	canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o cipher-aesctr.o \
 	cipher-ctr.o cleanup.o \
-	compat.o crc32.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
+	compat.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
 	log.o match.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \
 	readpass.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \
-	atomicio.o dispatch.o mac.o uuencode.o misc.o utf8.o \
+	atomicio.o dispatch.o mac.o misc.o utf8.o \
 	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
 	msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
 	ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
 	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
 	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
-	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-realpath.o \
 	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
 	sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o sandbox-pledge.o \
 	sandbox-solaris.o uidswap.o
@@ -151,11 +151,16 @@ FIXPATHSCMD	= $(SED) $(PATHSUBS)
 FIXALGORITHMSCMD= $(SHELL) $(srcdir)/fixalgorithms $(SED) \
 		     @UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS@
 
-all: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS)
+all: configure-check $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS)
 
 $(LIBSSH_OBJS): Makefile.in config.h
 $(SSHOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
 $(SSHDOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
+configure-check: $(srcdir)/configure
+
+$(srcdir)/configure: configure.ac aclocal.m4
+	@echo "ERROR: configure is out of date; please run ${AUTORECONF} (and configure)" 1>&2
+	@exit 1
 
 .c.o:
 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
@@ -184,8 +189,8 @@ ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o
 ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o
 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
 
-ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o
-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o sshsig.o
+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o sshsig.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
 
 ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o readconf.o uidswap.o compat.o
 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
@@ -196,8 +201,8 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11
 ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
 
-sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
-	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-realpath.o sftp-server-main.o
+	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-realpath.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
 
 sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
 	$(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
@@ -572,11 +577,14 @@ regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT): ${MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS} libssh.a
 	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS) \
 	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
 
-regress-binaries: regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) \
+regress-binaries: regress-prep $(LIBCOMPAT) \
+	regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/netcat$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT) \
-	regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT) \
+	regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT)
+
+regress-unit-binaries: regress-prep $(REGRESSLIBS) \
 	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT) \
@@ -587,7 +595,18 @@ regress-binaries: regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) \
 	regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT)
 
-tests interop-tests t-exec unit: regress-prep regress-binaries $(TARGETS)
+tests:	file-tests t-exec interop-tests unit
+	echo all tests passed
+
+unit: regress-unit-binaries
+	BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \
+	cd $(srcdir)/regress || exit $$?; \
+	$(MAKE) \
+		.OBJDIR="$${BUILDDIR}/regress" \
+		.CURDIR="`pwd`" \
+		$@ && echo $@ tests passed
+
+interop-tests t-exec file-tests: regress-prep regress-binaries $(TARGETS)
 	BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \
 	TEST_SSH_SCP="$${BUILDDIR}/scp"; \
 	TEST_SSH_SSH="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh"; \
@@ -633,7 +652,7 @@ tests interop-tests t-exec unit: regress-prep regress-binaries $(TARGETS)
 		TEST_SSH_ECC="$${TEST_SSH_ECC}" \
 		TEST_SHELL="${TEST_SHELL}" \
 		EXEEXT="$(EXEEXT)" \
-		$@ && echo all tests passed
+		$@ && echo all $@ passed
 
 compat-tests: $(LIBCOMPAT)
 	(cd openbsd-compat/regress && $(MAKE))

PROTOCOL.sshsig

+This document describes a lightweight SSH Signature format
+that is compatible with SSH keys and wire formats.
+
+At present, only detached and armored signatures are supported.
+
+1. Armored format
+
+The Armored SSH signatures consist of a header, a base64
+encoded blob, and a footer.
+
+The header is the string "-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----"
+followed by a newline. The footer is the string
+"-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----" immediately after a newline.
+
+The header MUST be present at the start of every signature.
+Files containing the signature MUST start with the header.
+Likewise, the footer MUST be present at the end of every
+signature.
+
+The base64 encoded blob SHOULD be broken up by newlines
+every 76 characters.
+
+Example:
+
+-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----
+U1NIU0lHAAAAAQAAADMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAAAgJKxoLBJBivUPNTUJUSslQTt2hD
+jozKvHarKeN8uYFqgAAAADZm9vAAAAAAAAAFMAAAALc3NoLWVkMjU1MTkAAABAKNC4IEbt
+Tq0Fb56xhtuE1/lK9H9RZJfON4o6hE9R4ZGFX98gy0+fFJ/1d2/RxnZky0Y7GojwrZkrHT
+FgCqVWAQ==
+-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----
+
+2. Blob format
+
+#define MAGIC_PREAMBLE "SSHSIG"
+#define SIG_VERSION    0x01
+
+        byte[6]   MAGIC_PREAMBLE
+        uint32    SIG_VERSION
+        string    publickey
+        string    namespace
+        string    reserved
+        string    hash_algorithm
+        string    signature
+
+The publickey field MUST contain the serialisation of the
+public key used to make the signature using the usual SSH
+encoding rules, i.e RFC4253, RFC5656,
+draft-ietf-curdle-ssh-ed25519-ed448, etc.
+
+Verifiers MUST reject signatures with versions greater than those
+they support.
+
+The purpose of the namespace value is to specify a unambiguous
+interpretation domain for the signature, e.g. file signing.
+This prevents cross-protocol attacks caused by signatures
+intended for one intended domain being accepted in another.
+The namespace value MUST NOT be the empty string.
+
+The reserved value is present to encode future information
+(e.g. tags) into the signature. Implementations should ignore
+the reserved field if it is not empty.
+
+Data to be signed is first hashed with the specified hash_algorithm.
+This is done to limit the amount of data presented to the signature
+operation, which may be of concern if the signing key is held in limited
+or slow hardware or on a remote ssh-agent. The supported hash algorithms
+are "sha256" and "sha512".
+
+The signature itself is made using the SSH signature algorithm and
+encoding rules for the chosen key type. For RSA signatures, the
+signature algorithm must be "rsa-sha2-512" or "rsa-sha2-256" (i.e.
+not the legacy RSA-SHA1 "ssh-rsa").
+
+This blob is encoded as a string using the RFC4243 encoding
+rules and base64 encoded to form the middle part of the
+armored signature.
+
+
+3. Signed Data, of which the signature goes into the blob above
+
+#define MAGIC_PREAMBLE "SSHSIG"
+
+        byte[6]   MAGIC_PREAMBLE
+        string    namespace
+        string    reserved
+        string    hash_algorithm
+        string    H(message)
+
+The preamble is the six-byte sequence "SSHSIG". It is included to
+ensure that manual signatures can never be confused with any message
+signed during SSH user or host authentication.
+
+The reserved value is present to encode future information
+(e.g. tags) into the signature. Implementations should ignore
+the reserved field if it is not empty.
+
+The data is concatenated and passed to the SSH signing
+function.
+

README

-See https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#8.0p1 for the release notes.
+See https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#8.1p1 for the release notes.
 
 Please read https://www.openssh.com/report.html for bug reporting
 instructions and note that we do not use Github for bug reporting or

README.privsep

@@ -5,13 +5,10 @@ escalation by containing corruption to an unprivileged process.
 More information is available at:
 	http://www.citi.umich.edu/u/provos/ssh/privsep.html
 
-Privilege separation is now enabled by default; see the
-UsePrivilegeSeparation option in sshd_config(5).
-
-When privsep is enabled, during the pre-authentication phase sshd will
-chroot(2) to "/var/empty" and change its privileges to the "sshd" user
-and its primary group.  sshd is a pseudo-account that should not be
-used by other daemons, and must be locked and should contain a
+Privilege separation is now mandatory.  During the pre-authentication
+phase sshd will chroot(2) to "/var/empty" and change its privileges to the
+"sshd" user and its primary group.  sshd is a pseudo-account that should
+not be used by other daemons, and must be locked and should contain a
 "nologin" or invalid shell.
 
 You should do something like the following to prepare the privsep

auth-bsdauth.c

@@ -29,8 +29,6 @@
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "sshkey.h"

auth-options.c

-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.84 2018/10/03 06:38:35 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.89 2019/09/13 04:36:43 dtucker Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2018 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
  *
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
+#include <stdlib.h>
 #include <netdb.h>
 #include <pwd.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -39,75 +40,6 @@
 #include "ssh2.h"
 #include "auth-options.h"
 
-/*
- * Match flag 'opt' in *optsp, and if allow_negate is set then also match
- * 'no-opt'. Returns -1 if option not matched, 1 if option matches or 0
- * if negated option matches.
- * If the option or negated option matches, then *optsp is updated to
- * point to the first character after the option.
- */
-static int
-opt_flag(const char *opt, int allow_negate, const char **optsp)
-{
-	size_t opt_len = strlen(opt);
-	const char *opts = *optsp;
-	int negate = 0;
-
-	if (allow_negate && strncasecmp(opts, "no-", 3) == 0) {
-		opts += 3;
-		negate = 1;
-	}
-	if (strncasecmp(opts, opt, opt_len) == 0) {
-		*optsp = opts + opt_len;
-		return negate ? 0 : 1;
-	}
-	return -1;
-}
-
-static char *
-opt_dequote(const char **sp, const char **errstrp)
-{
-	const char *s = *sp;
-	char *ret;
-	size_t i;
-
-	*errstrp = NULL;
-	if (*s != '"') {
-		*errstrp = "missing start quote";
-		return NULL;
-	}
-	s++;
-	if ((ret = malloc(strlen((s)) + 1)) == NULL) {
-		*errstrp = "memory allocation failed";
-		return NULL;
-	}
-	for (i = 0; *s != '\0' && *s != '"';) {
-		if (s[0] == '\\' && s[1] == '"')
-			s++;
-		ret[i++] = *s++;
-	}
-	if (*s == '\0') {
-		*errstrp = "missing end quote";
-		free(ret);
-		return NULL;
-	}
-	ret[i] = '\0';
-	s++;
-	*sp = s;
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static int
-opt_match(const char **opts, const char *term)
-{
-	if (strncasecmp((*opts), term, strlen(term)) == 0 &&
-	    (*opts)[strlen(term)] == '=') {
-		*opts += strlen(term) + 1;
-		return 1;
-	}
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static int
 dup_strings(char ***dstp, size_t *ndstp, char **src, size_t nsrc)
 {
@@ -320,7 +252,7 @@ handle_permit(const char **optsp, int allow_bare_port,
 	size_t npermits = *npermitsp;
 	const char *errstr = "unknown error";
 
-	if (npermits > INT_MAX) {
+	if (npermits > SSH_AUTHOPT_PERMIT_MAX) {
 		*errstrp = "too many permission directives";
 		return -1;
 	}
@@ -332,7 +264,8 @@ handle_permit(const char **optsp, int allow_bare_port,
 		 * Allow a bare port number in permitlisten to indicate a
 		 * listen_host wildcard.
 		 */
-		if (asprintf(&tmp, "*:%s", opt) < 0) {
+		if (asprintf(&tmp, "*:%s", opt) == -1) {
+			free(opt);
 			*errstrp = "memory allocation failed";
 			return -1;
 		}

auth-options.h

-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.27 2018/06/06 18:23:32 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.28 2019/07/09 04:15:00 djm Exp $ */
 
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2018 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@
 struct passwd;
 struct sshkey;
 
+/* Maximum number of permitopen/permitlisten directives to accept */
+#define SSH_AUTHOPT_PERMIT_MAX 4096
+
 /*
  * sshauthopt represents key options parsed from authorized_keys or
  * from certificate extensions/options.

auth-pam.c

@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ pthread_create(sp_pthread_t *thread, const void *attr,
 	switch ((pid = fork())) {
 	case -1:
 		error("fork(): %s", strerror(errno));
-		return (-1);
+		return errno;
 	case 0:
 		close(ctx->pam_psock);
 		ctx->pam_psock = -1;
@@ -258,7 +258,7 @@ static char **
 pam_getenvlist(pam_handle_t *pamh)
 {
 	/*
-	 * XXX - If necessary, we can still support envrionment passing
+	 * XXX - If necessary, we can still support environment passing
 	 * for platforms without pam_getenvlist by searching for known
 	 * env vars (e.g. KRB5CCNAME) from the PAM environment.
 	 */
@@ -266,6 +266,14 @@ pam_getenvlist(pam_handle_t *pamh)
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifndef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
+static int
+pam_putenv(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name_value)
+{
+	return PAM_SUCCESS;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_PAM_PUTENV */
+
 /*
  * Some platforms, notably Solaris, do not enforce password complexity
  * rules during pam_chauthtok() if the real uid of the calling process
@@ -360,13 +368,11 @@ import_environments(struct sshbuf *b)
 	for (i = 0; i < num_env; i++) {
 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &env, NULL)) != 0)
 			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
 		/* Errors are not fatal here */
 		if ((r = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, env)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
 			error("PAM: pam_putenv: %s",
 			    pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, r));
 		}
-#endif
 		/* XXX leak env? */
 	}
 #endif
@@ -535,7 +541,7 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
 	for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) {
 		/* Count */
 		if (i > INT_MAX)
-			fatal("%s: too many enviornment strings", __func__);
+			fatal("%s: too many environment strings", __func__);
 	}
 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, i)) != 0)
 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
@@ -548,7 +554,7 @@ sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
 	for (i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++) {
 		/* Count */
 		if (i > INT_MAX)
-			fatal("%s: too many PAM enviornment strings", __func__);
+			fatal("%s: too many PAM environment strings", __func__);
 	}
 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, i)) != 0)
 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
@@ -770,7 +776,7 @@ static void *
 sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
 	struct pam_ctxt *ctxt;
-	int socks[2];
+	int result, socks[2];
 
 	debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
 	/*
@@ -797,9 +803,10 @@ sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	}
 	ctxt->pam_psock = socks[0];
 	ctxt->pam_csock = socks[1];
-	if (pthread_create(&ctxt->pam_thread, NULL, sshpam_thread, ctxt) == -1) {
+	result = pthread_create(&ctxt->pam_thread, NULL, sshpam_thread, ctxt);
+	if (result != 0) {
 		error("PAM: failed to start authentication thread: %s",
-		    strerror(errno));
+		    strerror(result));
 		close(socks[0]);
 		close(socks[1]);
 		free(ctxt);
@@ -844,6 +851,7 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
 			plen += mlen;
 			**echo_on = (type == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON);
 			free(msg);
+			sshbuf_free(buffer);
 			return (0);
 		case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
 		case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
@@ -872,6 +880,7 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
 				**echo_on = 0;
 				ctxt->pam_done = -1;
 				free(msg);
+				sshbuf_free(buffer);
 				return 0;
 			}
 			/* FALLTHROUGH */
@@ -898,6 +907,7 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
 				**echo_on = 0;
 				ctxt->pam_done = 1;
 				free(msg);
+				sshbuf_free(buffer);
 				return (0);
 			}
 			error("PAM: %s for %s%.100s from %.100s", msg,
@@ -909,9 +919,11 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
 			**echo_on = 0;
 			free(msg);
 			ctxt->pam_done = -1;
+			sshbuf_free(buffer);
 			return (-1);
 		}
 	}
+	sshbuf_free(buffer);
 	return (-1);
 }
 
@@ -1205,7 +1217,6 @@ int
 do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
 {
 	int ret = 1;
-#ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
 	char *compound;
 	size_t len;
 
@@ -1215,7 +1226,6 @@ do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
 	snprintf(compound, len, "%s=%s", name, value);
 	ret = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, compound);
 	free(compound);
-#endif
 
 	return (ret);
 }

auth-rhosts.c

-/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.49 2018/07/09 21:35:50 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-rhosts.c,v 1.51 2019/10/02 00:42:30 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
@@ -38,7 +38,6 @@
 #include "sshkey.h"
 #include "servconf.h"
 #include "canohost.h"
-#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "hostfile.h"
 #include "auth.h"
 
@@ -222,8 +221,8 @@ auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
 	 * are no system-wide files.
 	 */
 	if (!rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index] &&
-	    stat(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0 &&
-	    stat(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, &st) < 0) {
+	    stat(_PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV, &st) == -1 &&
+	    stat(_PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV, &st) == -1) {
 		debug3("%s: no hosts access files exist", __func__);
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -253,7 +252,7 @@ auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
 	 * Check that the home directory is owned by root or the user, and is
 	 * not group or world writable.
 	 */
-	if (stat(pw->pw_dir, &st) < 0) {
+	if (stat(pw->pw_dir, &st) == -1) {
 		logit("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
 		    "no home directory %.200s", pw->pw_name, pw->pw_dir);
 		auth_debug_add("Rhosts authentication refused for %.100s: "
@@ -278,7 +277,7 @@ auth_rhosts2(struct passwd *pw, const char *client_user, const char *hostname,
 		/* Check users .rhosts or .shosts. */
 		snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.500s/%.100s",
 			 pw->pw_dir, rhosts_files[rhosts_file_index]);
-		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0)
+		if (stat(buf, &st) == -1)
 			continue;
 
 		/*

auth.c

-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.138 2019/01/19 21:41:18 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.141 2019/10/02 00:42:30 djm Exp $ */
 /*
  * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
  *
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 
+#include <stdlib.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
@@ -72,7 +73,6 @@